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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
payment of the check, did not arise from any act of, and therefore
need not be indemnified by, the third-party defendants.
However, unlike the practice under the CPA, where the com-
plaint would likely have been dismissed,67 Rule 1010 of the CPLR
affords the court broad discretion in disposing of third-party causes
of action. In applying this rule the court examined the relative
equities of the parties and decided that a consolidation would effect
the best result. Though Section 602 of the CPLR, which treats
specifically of consolidation, appears to require a motion for such
relief, the "such other order as may be just" words of rule 1010
appear to give a firm ground to the court's action in the instant
case.
In view of the hesitancy of the courts to dismiss third-party
complaints at the pleading stage,6s and considering the broad dis-
cretion afforded by rule 1010, outright dismissal of third-party
complaints should be less frequent in the future.
Policy Held to Limit Insurer's Right to 1Inplead Tortfeasor
Substantive law determines whether a third-party cause of
action exists.6 9 For example, in the recent case of Ross v. Paw-
tucket Mut. Ins. Co.,70 an insured brought an action against an
insurance carrier on an automobile collision policy. The insurer
served a third-party complaint on the alleged tortfeasors. The
Court of Appeals in affirming the dismissal of the third-party
complaint, held that since the right of subrogation did not accrue
under the policy until payment of the claim by the carrier, the
carrier may not implead the third-party tortfeasors.'-1
Prior to this decision there was a divergence of opinion in
New York on the issue Ross resolved. Some cases indicated that
the insurer may not implead a third-party before payment of the
67 For cases dismissing complaints where impleader was improper, see
Central Budget Corp. v. Perdigan, 32 Misc. 2d 655, 228 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Verder v. Schack, 90 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1949).6 8 De Lilli v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 839, 202
N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1960) (court must look at third-party pleadings
liberally on a motion to dismiss); Schellhorn v. New York State Elec. &
Gas Corp., 283 App. Div. 678, 127 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1954) (where
main complaint may be construed as charging third-party plaintiff with
passive negligence even though it also charges him with active negligence,
court will not dismiss third-party complaint).69 See Bernstein v. El-Mar Painting & Decorating Corp., 13 N.Y.2d
1053, 195 N.E.2d 456, 245 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1963) (landlord's tross-complaint
dismissed since he was actively negligent); Note, 28 FoaDHAmI L. Rnv. 782
(1960).
70 13 N.Y.2d 233, 195 N.E.2d 892, 246 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1963).71 1d. at 234, 195 N.E.2d at 893, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 214. But see W. T.
Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st
Dep't 1963).
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claim.72 Thus, it was held that an insurer had no right to maintain
a separate action for recoupment until payment, 73 and that it was not
a breach of the policy's cooperation clause for the insured to refuse
to implead a third party in an action against such insured which
was covered by the policy.7 4  Other cases adopted the federal
viewpoint 75 and held that the insurer may implead a third party
before the right of subrogation accrued through payment to the
insured.78 The opinion in Ross merely stated that the resolution
of the problem depended on the "nature of the subrogation right
and the terms of the policy itself."'77
Allowing impleader in the instant case might have resulted in
a longer trial and the postponement of payment to the insured of
a legitimate claim while the issues of negligence were tried in the
third-party action in which the insured had no interest.78  On the
other side, the decision limits the use of section 1007 by insurers
by indicating that limitations on subrogation rights even as arising
under the contract override the right to implead. Perhaps the
insurance policy should be made to confer a kind of "tentative"
subrogation in these circumstances.
INFANTS
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem Before Action Commenced
While the CPLR does not require that a guardian ad litem be
appointed for an infant in every instance, 79 rule 1202 permits the
court in which the action is triable to appoint a guardian ad litem
"at any stage in the action." Recently the New York Supreme
Court, 0 in a case of first impression,8' held that under this rule
72 See Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 409, 71 N.E.2d 321, 208
N.Y.S.2d 978 (1960); McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co., 221 N.Y. 92, 116
N.E. 787 (1917).73 American Home Assur. Co. v. Botto, 31 Misc. 2d 277, 219 N.Y.S.2d 764
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
74American Sur. Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876, 154
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1956).
75 St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959) ; Glens Falls Indem. Co.
v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
78 Madison Ave. Properties Corp. v. Royal Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 641,
120 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't 1953); Oswego County v. American Sur. Co.,
63 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1946), af'd, 272 App. Div. 862, 70 N.Y.S.2d
927 (4th Dep't 1947).
77 Ross v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 13 N.Y.2d 233, 234, 195 N.E.2d 892,
893, 246 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (1963).
78 See Madison Ave. Properties Corp. v. Royal Ins. Co., supra note 76,
at 646, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 631.7 9 See WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 71 (1963).
s0In re Major's Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
81 But see Gelenter v. Gelenter, 19 Misc. 2d 25, 187 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) (where it appeared in the facts that plaintiff had applied for and
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